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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to identify the major determinants of the unfunded liability for state and local public
defined benefit (DB) pension plans across the United States (U.S.) State and local pension plans are
required to fulfill a commitment to pay lifetime pension benefits to its retirees. As the dependent variable,
the unfunded liability (UL) within each state plan is analyzed to determine which financial lever emerges
as the dominant force to help close the funding gap. Source data consists of 16 years (2003-2018) of Plan
Data derived from the Public Plan Data (PPD) gathered by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College (CRR) and the Center for State and Local Government Excellence (SLGE). Annual State
Government Finances Tables published by the U.S. Census Bureau were also used to review state
expenditures and revenues to include 1) Bureau of Economic Analysis/Real Gross Product Annual by
State and 2) Trading Economics/U.S. GDP per capita. I apply a multiple linear regression empirical
model of panel data with both cross-section and period factors fixed with robust standard errors. My
findings show that the UL held a strong negative correlation to the discount rate, investment allocation,
and the average 10-year investment returns. Model results also revealed that as the annual required
employer contribution or the tax revenue per capita increases, the UL also increases. These results help to
provide solutions on how certain financial measures can help reduce the unfunded liability gap (ULG)
within state public DB pension plans across the U.S.
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Introduction
The main purpose of this study is to identify the key determinants of the unfunded liability (UL) for state
and local public Defined Benefit (DB) pension plans. The UL is a measure of pension debt in plans across
the U.S. This debt continues to rise while pension obligations to current and future retirees must also be
satisfied. The UL is derived by subtracting the market value of plan assets from its accrued liabilities. If
assets are less than liabilities, it signals a lack of funds set aside to cover all pension benefits and
generates what is known as an unfunded liability on the financial books of many states across the country.
If assets exceed liabilities, a plan is considered fully funded. The pension and employee benefits
committee noted that full funding does not usually imply that the pension plan has sufficient assets to
cover its solvency liabilities (unless the funding objective is to achieve a solvency level of
funding.) 1 Throughout my manuscript, I will refer to the unfunded liability (UL) as the actual accrued
liability and refer to the unfunded liability gap (ULG) as an expression of the financial factors that could
help to reduce the liability. The contributing factors to receive a DB pension benefit, involves a
combination of both the plan design and fiscal health of pension plans. Plan design can range from
elements of retirement requirements such as age, years of service, average salary, service credits,
mandatory employee contributions, while fiscal health includes parameters that measure the financial
impact of the pension liability. Examples include and not limited to, employers’ contributions, tax
revenue per capita, Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP) per capita, budget surplus, discount rates and
other investment measures.
Napoletoano and Schmidt (2021) highlights that retirement is a major concern that individuals have
around their finances and points to the 2019 survey by the Aegon Center for Longevity that shows almost
half of Americans worry that they will outlive their savings and are also concerned that their investments
will not provide the returns needed to live comfortably in retirement. According to the survey, only 32
percent (global 25 percent) feel they are on track to achieve 67% of replacement income in retirement 2
To be well-situated and obtain financial freedom during retirement years, workers may choose to
participate in either a defined contribution (DC) plan, or their employer may provide a DB plan. The
choice of plan can depend on whether the employer is a private or public entity. Throughout this analysis,
a public employer is defined as a state or an agency within the state, a city, county, township, school
district, or a public institution of higher education. A private employer refers to an employer that is not

Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding and the Role of Actuaries Educational Monograph, May 2018.
The Aegon Retirement Readiness Survey is conducted annually in collaboration with nonprofits Transamerica Center for
Retirement Studies® in the United States and Instituto de Longevidade Mongeral Aegon in Brazil.
1
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the state or any political subdivision, municipality, or other public agency of the state. 3 This report will
draw attention to the defined benefit plans across the U.S. in the public sector.
To help better understand the impact of the pension liability within the United States. It is important to
become acquainted with the recent retirement asset landscape as shown in Table 1 below. According to
the Investment Institute Research Fourth Quarter 2019 year-end report, $32.3 trillion in total retirement
assets of which, $6.7 trillion (21%) represent defined benefits plans that include federal, state and local
plans and $3.4 trillion (11%) represent private sector defined benefit plans. The defined contribution
landscape represents $9.0 trillion or 28% of total assets ($6.2 trillion represent private DC plans and $2.7
trillion represent 403(b) and 457 plans.) State and local government pension benefits are paid from trust
funds to which public employees and their employers contributed while they were working (PPD
database, 2019). The assets within the trust fund are expected to grow over time and are used for funding
a lifelong pension obligation for current and future retirees. The assets are measured against the pension
liabilities to determine whether a plan is unfunded (lower assets than liabilities) or fully funded (higher
assets than liabilities). The relationship between financial factors (such as projected contributions,
economic measures, portfolio allocation and investment returns) and the UL are observed throughout this
paper.
The defined benefit (DB) obligation in the public sector represents a mathematical calculation of an
estimated percentage of base salary and a monthly annual plan benefit. This benefit commonly includes
three key components for normal retirement such as age, salary, and length of service (Ashford and
Schmidt, 2021). For example, the State of Connecticut’s Teachers Retirement Board estimator of benefits
includes several factors such as age at retirement, number of years worked, (i.e., credited service) and
three highest salary years (Appendix, Table 2). Many private companies have shifted from DB to DC
plans to transfer the risks from the employer to the employee (Broadhurst, Palumbo and Woodman,
2006). The rationale for this change by many private firms has been due to a few key and notable facts
such as the elimination of the future pension liability owed to plan participants, tax benefits, lower plan
administration expenses and employers no longer responsible for the investment performance of the plan.
The employee bears the financial risk of participating in a DC plan where the amount of savings at
retirement is determined by factors such as age, time horizon, and most importantly, the contribution
amount and investments selected. For DB plans, the employer bears the investment risk that returns on
assets may fall short of the growth of the pension liability. Longevity risk is another risk that employers
may realize because they are obligated to offer DB benefits as a deferred lifetime annuity. As

3

Wage and Hour Division, an agency within the U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210, www.dol.gov, 2020.
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beneficiaries of DB plans now live longer, it will also extend the benefit payment timeline. Therefore, it is
impossible to ignore DB plans in the public sector where states (the employer) and ultimately taxpayers
across the U.S. continue to bear the risk on behalf of the state and local employees.
TABLE 1
U.S. RETIREMENT MARKET ASSETS 4
$32.3T
December 31, 2019
Type of Plan

Type of Entity

Plan Contributions

Who Bears Most?
Risk?

How is the monthly
benefit determined?

DB Defined Benefit
$10T 5

Public and Private
($6.7T/$3.4T)

Employer and/or
Employee

Employer

Benefit is calculated in advance: based on the
employee’s years of service, age, salary etc.

DC Defined Contribution
$9T 6

Public and Private
($2.7T/$6.2T)

Employer and/or
Employee3

Employee

Benefit is undefined and controlled by the
employee factors such age, time horizon, amount
contribution and funds selected

Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs)
$11.0T 7

Financial
Institutions

Self-Directed by
Investor

Investor

Benefit is undefined and controlled by the
investor factors such age, time horizon,
amount contribution and funds selected

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Retirement income can be generated from a variety of sources such as a pension or annuity, personal
savings, investments (i.e., CDs, bonds, mutual funds, stocks and real estate holdings, etc.) and Social
Security benefits. 8 Social Security is a major source of retirement income for those wage earners that are
covered employees and according to the Social Security Administration (SSA), 89 percent of U.S.
workers ages 21 to 64 are in "covered" employment. There are some groups that are considered “noncovered” employees and in many cases, these employees will be granted a state pension plan rather than
Social Security. Non-covered employees may include teachers, U.S. government employees hired before
1984, railroad employees covered by a separate pension and foreign nationals who work in the U.S. for
their home government. 9 The livelihood and employee benefit expectations of the worker were seriously
impacted within both the private and public sector. In fact, the 1980s brought a drastic shift to the
traditional employer/employee relationship with employers using layoffs to maximize profits. Although
Investment Institute Research Fourth Quarter 2019
Defined Benefit plan provide a fixed, pre-established benefit for employees at retirement, IRS.gov, 2021.
6 Defined Contribution plan is a retirement plan in which the employee and/or employer contribute to the employees individual
account under the plan, IRS.gov, 2021
7A Traditional IRA is a tax-advantaged personal savings plan where contributions may be tax deductible, IRS gov, 2021.
8The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is a nongovernmental organization that writes and enforces rules for
brokers and broker-dealers, Finra.org, Sources of Retirement Income, 2021.
9 Formerly called the American Association of Retired Persons, AARP Social Security Resource Center, is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan organization that empowers people to choose how they live as they age, https://www.aarp.org/retirement/socialsecurity/questions-answers/benefits/.
4
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public sector workers were impacted to a lesser degree, there is no doubt that state and local entities
(including teachers and schools) have been impacted by the changing socio-economic times with
increasing occurrences of job eliminations and school closings. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), the median tenure of workers ages 45 to 54 is 7.5 years in 2020 as compared to 8.4 years
in January 1981. 10
Employer and/or employee contributions made into some type of employer-sponsored retirement plan are
needed to help satisfy income for a retiree’s lifetime. The employer makes most contributions to a DB
plan however, employee contributions can be required, or voluntary contributions may be permitted. For
DC plans, the employees can choose to voluntarily contribute to their retirement plan up to a certain limit
(401k plans). Their employers can choose to match employee contributions with additional funds or
choose to make elective contributions irrespective of the amount contributed by the employee (Enright,
2021).
According to the aggregated state and local pension DB plans across the U.S. from 2003-2018, adjusted
PPD data increased the unfunded liability to $1.43 trillion in 2018 from $1.40 trillion in 2017 (Fig. 1).
The UL is designated as the key dependent variable; and multiple independent variables are measured to
determine the relationship between the unfunded liability across all 50 states. Independent variables
represent annual plan contributions, tax revenue, budget surplus, GDP per capita, discount rates and
others were tested against the UL. There is much discussion around whether carrying an unfunded
pension liability impedes a public employer’s (i.e., state or employer) ability to continue to pay millions
of current and future retirees their respective pension benefits. One position claim that having an
outstanding UL does not result in a state’s incapability to fund its pension plan (Florida Public Pension
Trustees Association, FPPTA, 2011). The opposing position states that being underfunded 11 is a
hindrance and could have a negative long-term impact on the state’s pension obligation (Novy-Marx and
Rauh, 2009.)

10 State and Local Governments Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). U.S Department of Wage and Labor division,
March 2011.
11 According to the Florida Public Pension Trustees Association (FPPTA), “Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded
Liability.” The term “underfunded” means that the plan sponsor has not made sufficient contributions to fund the present and
future liabilities of promised benefits.

Which Financial Measures Can Be Leveraged To Help Close The Unfunded Liability Gap For State Pension Plans? 7

Brief History
Pensions initially served as extra compensation to persuade people to enlist into the military (Longley,
2020). The first pension law was enacted during the Revolutionary War, and initially, states were
responsible for making payments and many were faced with budget challenges. In 1789, legislation was
passed where the U.S. government assumed full responsibility for making the pension payments to
disabled veterans. The federal government passed additional legislation increasing benefits for veterans
and their families as the country grew ever more prosperous. In 1818, benefits were expanded to all
veterans for life instead of a few years. In 1875, The American Express Company was the first private
company to offer a DB pension plan to help fulfill the need for lifetime retirement income. The plan was
offered during the Reconstruction era to workers who were 60 years of age, had a tenure of 20 years and
were directed to retire by a manager (Phipps, 2021). Twenty years later, public non-military plans were
offered, and the Chicago Teacher’s plan became one of the oldest non-military public plans with an
inception date of 1895. The state of Illinois along with several plans within CA, MA, MN, NY, and PA
were established during the Progressive era which took place during the 1890s to 1920s (Longley, 2020).
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 12 was put in place to establish a
regulatory framework for private DC and DB plans. These private pension plans provided financial
support in the retirement years for many Americans and ERISA was Congress’s attempt to devise a
comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of Americans (Wooten, 2004). ERISA plans must
also adhere to Department of Labor regulations under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act. ERISA rules help mitigate certain risks for private DB plans such as agency risk, forfeiture risk and
default risk (Wooten 2004). Agency risk is the risk that the employer might misuse assets and not have
enough to meet their pension obligation. Forfeiture risk is the risk that employees could lose their
pension benefit due to layoff or job change. Default risk is the risk that the plan could become insolvent
and be unable to fulfill its financial commitment. These key risks currently exist in the public pension
world today. However, mitigation of these risks in the private sector includes but are not limited to:
•
•

Fiduciary standards of conduct, minimum vesting, and funding standards for employers.
Employers are required to set up separate financial resources to help meet their obligation.

12 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is a federal law that sets minimum standards for most
voluntarily established retirement and health plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these plans,
Employee Benefits Security Administration, an agency within the U.S. Department of Labor.
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•

Participation in a federal program (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation – PBGC) that pays
vested pension benefits in the event of plan termination in the private sector DB plans. 13

Public DB plans (non-ERISA plans) are not required to follow ERISA standards. For example, no
insurance (PBGC) exists for public employees. Therefore, should a gap in funding the liability exists, the
state and/or municipality should reassess their budgets to find ways to cover the shortfall. My findings
reveal that an increase in annual required contributions (ARC) would not necessarily decrease the
unfunded liability but would increase the dependent variable. Although this was an unforeseen finding,
there is no mandate for public state plans to make timely contributions. In fact, the ARC is perceived to
be an optional or suggested payment by public DB plan administrators and not truly as a required annual
payment. There is no mandate for public state plans to make timely contributions at all. This is
remarkably similar to how households manage their day-to-day budget. Individuals choose to determine
the amount, timing, and frequency of their respective bill payments. Inconsistent behavior may result in
consequences such as fee penalties, higher interest rates and a reduced credit score. Similarly, state, and
public employees can skip making their share of contributions. The expectations of employees do vary
from state to state and there are situations where employee contributions are either voluntary or
mandatory. As the normal cost of benefits for each member continues to be accrued, a continual pattern of
nonpayment and/or erratic payments would cause an increase in the unfunded liability.
As a former investment consultant who acted on behalf of insurance company retirement providers for
many years, I have witnessed public pension administrators throughout the U.S. who were called upon to
make key decisions for both Defined Contribution (DC) and Defined Benefit (DB) retirement plans.
These key overseers usually consist of several board members that hold roles such as Human Resource
Directors, Finance Directors and Chief Financial Officers (CFO). It is also common for board members to
gain membership through appointment. the board representatives have an important responsibility to
partner with a provider of retirement services (i.e., insurance companies, investment consultants,
brokerage firms and mutual fund companies) as well as an actuarial firm to make key investment
decisions for thousands of employees. Most boards follow the guidance of an investment policy statement
(IPS) which outlines parameters around investment selection and the addition and removal of investments
for DC and DB plans. This process is in place to ensure that retirement plans are properly positioned to
meet their future pension obligations as employees retire from their employer. DB plans take a similar
approach as their DC counterparts in that both strategies seek to find the best asset allocation to achieve

13

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, A U.S Government Agency, updated March 2021,
https://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/pg/general-faqs-about-pbgc.
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the most efficient return. Public and private entities must follow the standards and the plan reporting
requirements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The objective of FASB and the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is for plans to report benefit obligations and pension
fund assets in a uniform manner. 14
Literature Review and Motivation
As the industry examines the plan design and financial health of public pension plans, notable statistics
studied by actuaries, pension administration, consultants and other industry experts were prevalent in the
pension liability conversation. Antolin (2008) in collaboration with other private institutions assessed
performance by country on a risk-adjusted basis using relatively standard investment performance
measures. Additionally, the relationships between the characteristics of each pension system were
examined including individual regulatory environments and the investment performance. Antolin
highlights a few challenges and limitations with reporting and analyzing numbers by country such as the
validity of the risk-adjusted measure Sharpe ratio and the use of artificially constructed country-specific
benchmarks for a large variety of pension plans across the countries (not necessarily the same). His
analysis included both DC and DB private plans and lacked attention on public pension plans. Another
noteworthy study by Beshears, Liabson and Madrian (2011) finds that replacement income within the
public sector varies greatly across jurisdictions. Though a reduction of the unfunded pension liability was
not of emphasis, they specified that the shift from DB to DC plan offering would result in the need for
participants to save more in other retirement accounts. The authors also make a distinction on how public
sector and primary DC plans are characterized by required employee or employer contributions vs.
employee voluntary contributions within the private sector. Their research concludes by applying lessons
from savings behavior in private sector savings plans to the design of public sector plans.
Budget Stabilization Funds (BSFs) for public defined benefit plans are reserves set aside to protect the
state budget from cyclical changes in revenue and expenses. Clairs (2013) analyzed deposit and
withdrawal activity and its link to the employer contribution. His empirical results suggest that BSFs with
strict deposit rules are associated with higher pension contributions, while strict withdrawal rules are
associated with lower contributions. The connection discovered between the BSF, and pension
contributions aided in my decision to select employer contributions as a primary independent variable and
compared to the unfunded liability.

14

The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the independent, private- sector organization based in Norwalk,
Connecticut, which establishes accounting and financial reporting standards for U.S. state and local governments that follow
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), September 2021.
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Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) explores the true funding status of public pension plans across the U.S. and,
at times, question the usefulness and loosely reported pension liability. According to Novy-Marx and
Rauh (2009), each state plan reports only one actuarial number for its pension liability. They suggest that,
at a minimum, states should be required to report liabilities under several pre-specified discount rates,
such as Treasury interest rates and interest rates on taxable municipal bonds. The impact of discount rates
on the unfunded liability was not explored in this manuscript. Other non-academic writings including
Mohan and Zhang’s (2011) from University of Dayton School of Business, the authors studied
determinants of public pension plan risk-taking behavior using the percentage of total plan assets invested
in the equity markets and the pension asset beta as measures of investment risk. They found that
government accounting standards strongly affect public fund investment risk, as higher return
assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and beta.
The link between whether a link exists between discount rates and the unfunded liability will be explored
in this paper.
The condensed report (PEW and the Arnold Foundation, 2014) highlights that, up through 2012, pension
plans progressed from fixed income to an increased investment in equities and alternative funds. The
report also suggests that such changes come with increased costs and uncertainty around the future
realized returns. The assumed rate of return was compared to the 30-year Treasury bond. It was noted
that, between 1992 and 2012, the difference between the assumed rate of return and the yield on 30-Year
Treasury Bonds has increased from .33 percentage points to 4.83 percentage points. This brief and highlevel analysis alluded to the fact that there has been a shift to riskier investment allocations through 2012.
To further this study research, my review will include the investment allocation by state level to
determine whether a shift to equity and alternative investments continue to exist.
The Annual Required Contribution
The annual required contribution (ARC) is a principal factor when determining the true cost of the
pension plan. 15 The annual required contribution reflects the employer's contribution as reported in the
required supplementary tables for GASB accounting purposes. There are three main elements that
comprise the total expected contribution such as the employer normal cost amount, amortization of the
UL, other expenses (retirement, medical and administrative) and interest expense on the prior year’s
pension obligation. The annual required contribution is guided by General Accepted Standards Board
(GASB) statements 67 and 68 in the U.S. and there are factors (investment return assumptions,
” Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded Liability,” Florida Public Pension Trustees Association
(FPPTA), p. 4.
15
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amortization methods, funding policies and timing of payments) that differ from plan to plan and can
impact its calculation 16.
One may presume the ARC is a requirement for DB public plans because it is described as ‘required,’
however, it is generally known that there is an expectation for payment to be made versus a requirement
that it must be made. As an important distinction, this optional approach has resulted in partial
contributions to fund present and future liabilities or skipped contributions for several years. Although
making a payment should normally reduce the rate of indebtedness, it can actually increase the rate since;
1) the cost of the plan administration continues to be charged to the debt and 2) interest on the unfunded
liability continues to be applied. If a public plan chooses not to make the full ARC payment on an annual
basis and either makes partial payments, no payments or pays erratically, the clock will continue to tick
and increase the liability/debt of the total plan.
The ARC calculation is an annual snapshot in time of the DB plan. If the plan sponsor does not pay its
ARC in full every year, no amount of payment (unless it is in full) will stop the unfunded liability from
continuing to increase. Like the private sector DB plans of old, an ERISA-like requirement must be
passed where all plans must pay their ARC into their plan every year. This is the one of the ways plans
public DB plans will have hope of funding the promise made to their employees.
As discussed earlier, private DB plans adhere to regulatory rules of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). Additionally, the extension of ERISA, known as the Pension Protection Act (PPA)
of 2006 requires private plans to become 100% funded over time and to adhere to financial assumptions
that pension plans must fund objectives. These measures were established to ensure that minimum
contributions are made to satisfy the annual contribution expectation. A more recent change to single
employer private DB plans is the calculation for discounting interest rates. In response to a period of low
interest rates, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), established a process for
determining minimum and maximum interest rates for discounting based on 25-year averages of historical
corporate bond yields (Topoleski and Myers, 2020.) This act suggests that a lower interest rate would
result in a lower assumed investment return and/or more realistic present value of future payments for
employers to meet their pension obligations. As originally established, the funding corridor was

16 Established in 1984, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the independent, private- sector organization
based in Norwalk, Connecticut, which establishes accounting and financial reporting standards for U.S. state and local
governments that follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), https://www.gasb.org/aboutgasb.
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scheduled to widen eventually, which, when applied to the specified interest rates, would have
resulted in the use of lower interest rates to calculate private DB pension obligations.
Data and Methodology
The Public Plans Data (PPD), United States Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) were the four main data sources needed to analyze the relationship
between the dependent and independent variable by state.
The PPD was the leading data used and comprised of annual information on the largest state/local pension
plans in the U.S. The data is produced by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR)
and the Center for State and Local Government Excellence (SLGE) represented over 3,700 observations
from 2001-2018 across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Plan data does not track federal
employee retirement plans and therefore those plan types were not included in this analysis. Key pension
plan data included assets, funding, investments, other vital metrics, and membership within each state
across the U.S. In fact, data was available for multiple plans within each state from 2001-2018. To obtain
a balanced data set, where each plan is observed during the same time-period, 2001 and 2002 data were
excluded. A full comprehensive sample of data representing 2003-2018 was analyzed. All 50 states were
represented, and the federal District of Columbia was excluded because 16 years of plan data were not
reported. Data for 2019, was not yet complete and hence 2003 through 2018 represented 2,800
observations. On average there were approximately 3.5 public retirement plans per state (including plans
for teachers, municipalities, state workers etc.) One plan was assessed for Hawaii, Idaho Mississippi,
Oregon, and Wyoming. California and Texas represented the highest number with 15 and 10 public plans,
respectively. Data from the plans’ financial documents at times were used to highlight plan facts. The
PPD consists of public pension plans aggregated across all states and reflects significant variations in plan
benefit design, plan funding, membership composition, and investment strategies. It is an appropriate
starting position to analyze the plan results at the macro state level. Disaggregation could be a suitable
next step for future research (PPD database, 2019). Each state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita was used to determine its relationship with the unfunded liability. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis was the main source for the annual Real GDP and the United States Census Bureau was used to
determine the per capita numbers by state for GDP and tax revenue measures. Additionally, both sources
were also used to assess the states’ budget/ deficit/surplus in two ways, (GDP/per capita and GDP/per
state). The budget deficit/surplus by each state was reviewed to determine its relationship against the UL.
The U.S. Census Bureau Annual Survey of State Government Finances Tables were used to provide both
the revenue and expense data to calculate the budget deficit or surplus per GDP/state and GDP/per capita.
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Empirical Model
The multiple ordinary least squares linear regression model was selected because it is one of the best
models to assess the strength of the relationship between the unfunded liability (dependent variable)
represent by RUFL and fifteen predictor variables (independent variables) across the US. Independent
variables include, expected contributions, economic methods (i.e., tax revenue and budgets) and
investment strategy (assumed investment returns, actual returns, and portfolio mix).
Multiple ordinary least squares model:
RUFLi =β0+β1ARCR_ERit+β2ARCRit+β3TAXRPCit+β4GPERCit+β5BUDGDPit+β6BUDPCit
+β7DISCRit+β8PTRTNit+β9EQRTNit+β10FIRTNit+β11A3YRit+β12A5YRit+β13A10YRit+β14EQALLit+β15FI
ALL+εi
Where,
RUFL= is the dependent variable -referred to as return on unfunded liability [unfunded liability as a % of assets]
ARCR_ERiti =Employers projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll)
ARCRit =[Employer + Employee] projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll)
TAXRPCit =Tax revenue per capita
GPERCit =Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP) divided by Per Capita= [Real GDP by State/Per Capita]
BUDGDPit =Total Revenues (TR) less Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per State= [TR-TL/GDP]
BUDPCit =Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per Capita = [TR-TL/GDP Per Capita]
DISCRit =Assumed Discount Rate used to value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by
estimating expected rates of return.
PTRTN= Portfolio Return is the overall return of each plan includes various asset allocations
EQRTN= Equity Investment Return
FIRTN= Fixed Income Investment Return
A3YR= Average 3-Yr Investment Return
A5YR= Average 5-Yr Investment Return
A10YR= Average 10-Yr Investment Return
EQALL= Equity Asset Allocation Mix
FIALL= Fixed Income Allocation Mix
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Foundational structure
Multiple Linear Regression Model
Table 3 below shows the structure of the multiple linear regression model. The dependent variable is
equal to the accrued liability minus actuarial assets and expressed as a % of assets (RUFL). The
independent variables, mapped in three main categories such as expected contributions, economic
methods, and investment strategies. The investment strategy category has been further divided into three
separate groups to highlight a few differences between assumed returns, actual returns, and portfolio mix.
As a result, five groups of independent variables were formed and analyzed.
Each group were identified as balanced or unbalanced. Balanced data shows that every cross-section
follows same regular frequency, with the same start and end dates. For example, the balanced data
consists of 150 cross sections in the main model with annual data from 2003-2018. The unbalanced data
represent irregular or unreported data. For instance, the Atlanta General Employee Pension Fund showed
missing data for portfolio returns for 2018. Overall, there were 1,442 unbalanced observations in group 4
while group 5 revealed 2,302 observations.
Table 3 shows the expected payment known as Annual Required Contribution (ARC) is the main
independent variable and placed in Group 1. The “ARCR_ER” solely represents the employer
contribution and expressed as projected actuarial required contribution (ARC_ER rate as a percentage of
payroll) as shown on Fig. 4. The second variable in Group 1, identified as ARCR represent a combination
of both employee and employer contribution. This method was employed to determine whether the
ARCR_ER would act differently if an employee contribution were included in the payment. Group 2
represents other key economic measures such as tax revenue per capita, GDP per capita, budget per capita
and budget as a percentage of GDP. Group 3 include an assumed investment return (discount rate) as a
solo variable. Group 4 illustrates average 3-year, 5-year, and 10- year rates of return as well as portfolio
investment returns. Finally, group 5 represents the portfolio mix allocations (i.e., equity vs. fixed
income).
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Table 3
Dependent
variable

RUFL= Unfunded Liabilities= Expressed as Assets less Liabilities divided by Assets

Financial Levers

Independent
variables:

Expected
Contribution(s)

Economic
Methods

Group 1
Balanced

Group 2
Balanced

ARCR_ER1
ARCR2

TAXRPC3
GPERC4
BUDGDP5
BUDPC6

Other factors
All Preliminary Variables Tested and Explained

Investment
Strategy
Group 3
Balanced

Group 4
(Unbalanced)

Group 5
(Unbalanced)

Assumed
Investment
Returns

Actual
Investment
Returns

Portfolio
Allocation
Mix

DISCR7

PTRTN8
EQRTN9
FIRTN10
A3YR11
A5YR12
A10YR13

EQALL14
FIALL15

I= cross plan id
t= year

Table 3 list the dependent and all independent variables initially assessed throughout the analysis; represents the aggregate of all plans by state from
2003-2018
Employers projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll)
Total [Employer + Employee] projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll)
Tax revenue per capita
Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP) divided by Per Capita= [Real GDP by State/Per Capita]
Total Revenues (TR) less Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per State= [TR-TL/GDP]
Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per Capita = [TR-TL/GDP Per Capita]
Assumed Discount Rate used to value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by estimating expected rates of return.
PTRTN= Portfolio Return is the overall return of each plan include various asset allocations.
EQRTN= Equity Investment Return
FIRTN= Fixed Income Investment Return
A3YR= Average 3-Yr Investment Return
A5YR= Average 5-Yr Investment Return
A10YR= Average 10-Yr Investment Return
EQALL= Equity Allocation Mix
FIALL= Fixed Income Allocation Mix
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
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Model Results

Results are described by each type of financial measure such as contributions, economic levers,
and investment strategy. Counterintuitive results for both determinant variables (ARC and tax
revenue per capita variables) were observed. There was an expectation for the UL to decrease as
these variables increased. However, results show that a 1% increase in the ARC by the employer
or tax revenue will increase the UL. The multiple linear regression shows three independent
variables that emerged as highly statistically significant: a) annual employer contribution rate
(ARC_ER), b) tax revenue per capita and c) equity allocation mix. The results of the 15-variable
linear regression are shown on Table 3A in five groups. Those variables that were not
statistically significant were removed and the model was condensed from five groups to two
groups (Group 1 balanced and Group 2 unbalanced). The results are shown on Table 3B. Fig. 1,
displays the total aggregated unfunded liability which is the dependent variable as the total value
vs. the unfunded liability as a percentage of assets from 2003-2018. The panel model was
adjusted to reflect only those plans that showed data in each year from 2003-2018.
Model Results-Contributions
A 1% increase in the ARC_ER (expressed as a percentage of payroll) will increase the unfunded liability
(expressed as a percentage of assets) at 2.0% (Table 3A and 3B). For example, if the 2018 employer
required annual contribution for California Public Employees Retirement Fund (California PERF)
increased by 1% from $19.90B to $20.10B, the unfunded liability will rise from $150.40B to $153.41B. 17
Findings show that a slight increase to ARC_ER may not cause a reduction but an increase to the UL.
One may suggest that the rate of indebtedness should be reduced by solely making a payment however,
the results show that the rate can actually increase. This increase could happen as a result of plan
administration costs and the interest charged on the unfunded liability as time moves forward. A key
learning is that the ARC calculation determined by actuaries is an “expected” contribution, not a required
contribution for public pension plans. Some states have a policy that requires payment of the ARC,

Public Plan Database (PPD) (2019) Public plans data. Available at https://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database, Google
Scholar. Adjusted calculations were used to determine the impact to the unfunded liability.
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however other factors can affect those policies and the actual payment of the ARC. For example,
in New Jersey, two separate legal rulings found that the state’s ARC requirement, set in statute,
did not constitute a “self-executing appropriation” (Brainard and Brown, 2015). Therefore, should
a public plan choose not to make the full ARC payment on an annual basis or make partial payments, no
payments or pays erratically, the debt or liability will continue to increase. This behavior can be
compared to the process of making of credit card payments, for example, if a minimum payment is made
on a $500 outstanding balance, the minimum payment gets absorbed by the huge interest rate that is
continued to be charged, in addition the annual credit card fee must be paid.
The public pension plan itself does not stay static, there are long-time employees who were eligible for a
defined benefit pension now retiring and receiving payouts that must be funded on an annual basis. At the
same time, new employees are being hired (and not all are necessarily in their 20s or 30s), and therefore
new retirees add to the unfunded liability calculation, thus also inflating the debt or liability of the plan.
The current approach gives a plan complete freedom to choose whether to contribute the full expected
contribution amount, to make a partial payment of that expected amount or to decline to contribute at all.
I decided to further assess the model with a one-year lag to determine whether year 1 ARC_ER would
help impact funding in year 2. Table 4A results showed an increase to the liability where the rate shifted
from 2.0% without a lag to 1.9% with a one-year lag. Results were and is highly statistically significant.
A further reduction is shown in year 2 at 1.8%. As an example, if we apply the ARCR_ER rate of
reduction to the California PERF plan, the UL will rise to $153.39B with a one-year lag and $153.09B
with a two-year lag. Overall, both the first- and second-year lag shows statistically significant results and
reveals that the impact of a reduction may take a few years. It is important to note that results show that
the UL begins to slightly reduce at .52% when employee contribution is included with the employer
contribution [ARCR]. Table 3B and 3C shows that this reduction occurs without any lags.
Model Results-Economic Levers
As the tax revenue per capita increases by 1%, the UL will increase by more than 1% (Table 3B). State
and local government pension benefits are paid from trust funds to which public employees and their
employers contributed while they were working, not from general operating revenues. Trust fund assets
are invested and grow over time 18. Tax revenues are another sourcing option for state public pension
plans, to help fund their obligations. However, unlike private plans, there are no minimum funding

18

Public Plan Database (PPD) (2019). Available at https://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database, Google Scholar.
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requirements for the UL and therefore the independent variable is likely to continue to increase should the
plan decide against using tax revenues to make payment towards the annual contribution. A possible
solution is to mandate a certain percentage of state tax revenue should be used to fund the pension trust
obligation. Bagchi examined the effects of political competition on the generosity of public sector
pension plans and finds that as the level of political competition in a municipality increases, pension plans
become more generous, and plans may not fully fund their plans to keep taxes low (Bagchi, 2019). In a
more recent example, due to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, many states' tax revenues were
reduced, and those that use tax revenue to help pay for the unfunded liability chose to either skip payment
or make a partial payment toward their pension contribution. Others were waiting to see what amount of
assistance would arrive from the federal government. California canceled $500 million from a $3 billion
payment authorized in 2019 to pay down unfunded pension liabilities through fiscal 2023 and redirected
$2.4 billion remaining from the initial allocation to instead pay pension contributions owed by school
districts and community colleges 19. Tax revenues showed counterintuitive results and are another
sourcing option for state public pension plans, to help fund their obligations. As tax revenues increase by
1%, the UL is likely to continue to increase if the plan decides against using tax revenues to make
payment towards the annual contribution. Table 4A shows that, at a 1% rate increase in tax revenue per
capita with a lag of two-year will create a substantial increase the UL from 1% to 7%. The results clearly
show that until public plans are required to use tax revenue dollars to pay down on the UL the liability,
the debt will continue to increase even further in the second year. The second-year lag results show less
than a 10% risk that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis which states that no
relationship exists between state pension plans and the tax revenue per capita.
Model Results-Investment Strategy
The investment strategy involves several levels of assessment. To reduce pension debt, a higher market
value of plan assets must be achieved to cover the cost of current and future liabilities. Results show that
when the portion allocated to investment in companies (expressed as EQALL) increases by 1%, the UL is
reduced by .18% (Table 3B). While some data is unbalanced, the equity mix represent 1,520 records and
generates a mean of 52%, median 55% and standard deviation of 10.8%. The one-year and two-year lags
for equity allocation continue to show a reduction in the UL at around .17% and .28% respectively, with
strong results particularly in the second year (Table 4A). These statistics reveal that public defined benefit
How Pandemic-Driven Revenue Shortfalls Could Affect State Pension Contributions, Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.
January 13, 2021, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2021/01/13/how-pandemic-driven-revenueshortfalls-could-affect-state-pension-contributions/Google Scholar.
19
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plans have shifted from the assumption that fixed income represents the larger percentage of the
investment mix (PEW and the Arnold Foundation, 2014). Excluding 2008, assets were also allocated to
real estate, alternatives, private equities, commodities, and cash. The 2008 allocation shows that the
financial crisis has certainly impacted the allocation mix selection of many of the public pension plans
across the United States. Fig. 5, illustrates the trend of both equity and fixed allocation aggregated by all
plans used in dataset over the 16-year testing period. Though the fixed income allocation mix was not
significant, the investment results for conservative investments (bonds, certificate of deposits etc.), and
the 10-year average returns were all statistically significant. A 1% increase to the fixed income return
would increase the UL by .27% (Table 3B). This could occur if returns generated from stable assets do
not cover the outstanding liabilities between 2003-2018. While Table 3A shows a 1% increase to the
equity return portfolio will reduce the UL by a minute percentage, the results were not significant. The
reduction to the UL does occur however, with an increase in the 10-year investment returns. The longerterm return (average 10-year) is an essential factor to help close the ULG. As the 10-year return increases
by 1%, the unfunded liabilities would reduce by 2.6%, results were highly statistically significant (Table
3B). The one-year lag result for the 10- year return is also highly statistically significant and shows a
3.0% reduction in the UL (Table 4A). These results tell us that the investment strategy of developing the
right mix of equities and fixed income investments could overtime provide the returns needed to help
reduce the UL. Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of the average 10-year return of all aggregated plans used in the
dataset from 2003-2018. Note that 2004 shows the highest average 10-year return of 9.7% vs. 2009 and
2010 lower returns of 3.1% and 3.5%.
Fig. 6, shows both equity and fixed returns aggregated by all plans used in the dataset over the 16-year
testing period. It is important to observe that twelve out of sixteen years (75% of the time), higher equity
returns were generated versus fixed returns. Hence, the investment selection committee may choose to
increase their risk tolerance and allocate more to equities with hopes to achieve a higher return. This
action along with the ability to make timely ARC payments could help reduce the ULG.
Model Results-Assumed Discount Rate
The assumed investment return (commonly referred to as the discount rate) is important when
determining an effective investment strategy for public pension plans (Fig. 3). The discount rate is used to
value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by estimating expected rates of
return. This rate is a function of the risk-free interest rate plus the risk premium associated with public
plans not being able to pay their pension obligation and should reflect the risk of the pension liabilities
(Bui and Randazzo, 2015). The public plan aggregated data across the U.S., shows an average assumed
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discount rate of approximately 7.79% from 2003-2018. However, rates used by plans, may vary across
the country. For example, according to the PPD, the Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System
reported discount rates of 8.50%, 8.25% and 8.00% respectively from 2016-2018.
This shows a slight reduction in its discount rate over three consecutive years. The Connecticut State
Employees Retirement System used a lower rate of 6.90% from 2016 through 2018. Wisconsin, a 100%
funded ratio (considered a fully funded plan 20) shows a discount rate of 7.2%, 7.2% and 7.0% from the
same period (2016-2018). Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System, also 100% funded according to
the Pension data, uses a discount rate of 5.5%, 5.25% and 5.25% from 2016-2018.
Josh Rauh, chief economist at Stanford Graduate School of Business, states that public pension plans are
using an assumed discount rate that is too high. Rauh (2016) suggests a lower rate be used which would
mean that more money would need to be contributed now to support pension benefits that will be paid out
in the future. Some critics argue that by using an interest rate that is unreasonably low makes pension
funds worse than they are (Bond, Tyler, 2016). The use of a higher assumed investment return would
result in a higher present value of future payments of pension benefits. Fig. 3 compares the assumed
investment return known as the discount rate to the actual average 10- year return. The average 10-year
return and the discount rate represent aggregated plans used in the dataset from 2003-2018. The discount
rate shows a consistent average of 7.8% vs. the average10-year return of 6.8%.
A uniform and consistent proxy such as 10-year Treasury notes, 30-year bonds or high-grade municipal
bonds should be set as a standard for calculation of the assumed investment return. The rates would be
lower and may have a more realistic asset value than the assumed discount rate disclosed in the data
provided. Persistent testing of the discount rate shows a larger reduction of the UL without a lag than with
a two-year lag. Results reveal that a 1% increase in the discount rate will reduce the UL by 14% with a no
lag (Table 3C). This is a significant drop to the UL and the reduction will help to close the UL gap. It may
also explain that higher assumed investment returns reported by plan actuaries could result in a lower UL.
When evaluated with other statistically significant variables with one and two-year lags, findings show
that the one-year lag result was not statistically significant. However, the two- year lag reveals that a 1%
increase in the discount rate will cause the UL to fall by 3.68% with a two-year lag (Table 4A). The
results are statistically highly significant. To put it in further context, if the discount rate increases by 1%,

20 According to Florida Public Pension Trustees Association (FPPTA) a plan is considered fully funded if its assets exceed
liabilities, Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded Liability.”
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the 2018 total aggregated UL of $1.40T would see a reduction of $51.5B (resulting in a net UL of
approximately $1.35T).
Endogeneity
Two methods were executed to rule out endogeneity assumptions. The Wald Test was performed as a
joint significant test, and a lag identification approach was also used. The model was evaluated to see
whether all coefficients were equal to zero. The Wald Test concludes that joint coefficients are not equal
to 0 and that we can reject the null hypothesis. Table 4B shows us results that are highly statistically for
all seven independent variables. Therefore, we conclude that the model has predictive power where at
least one of the independent variables would help to predict our dependent variable.
A one- and two-year lagging approach was also assessed for all statistically significant variables and are
shown in Table 4A. These strategies were chosen to help alleviate threats to causal identification without
the need to use any other data than what is available in the data set.
Conclusion
One of the biggest financial concerns within the public and private retirement plan landscape is the ability
to pay out guaranteed lifetime pension obligations for current and future employees. To determine the
magnitude of the obligation, the UL (assets minus liabilities) was selected as the dependent variable and
measured against several variables grouped in three categories that included contributions, economic
methods, and investment strategy.
Results conclude that three of the fifteen predictor variables could help close the ULG. These variables
include the discount rate, avg 10-year returns and equity allocation on an aggregated statewide plan basis.
As pointed out during data analysis, other proxies such as 10-year Treasury notes, 30-year bonds or highgrade municipal bonds should be set as a standard for calculation of the assumed investment return known
as the discount rate. Additionally, an investment policy statement that outlines the most optimal asset
allocation strategy should be reviewed each year. Standard risk tolerance questions should be answered
and documented during the plan annual review the results should help develop the right asset mix of
equities and fixed income investments for the plan.
Results also reveals an increase to the UL when ARC increases by 1%. In order to reverse the increase, it
is my recommendation that the ARC payment by the employer be required, not optional. This approach
will ensure that full payments are made and in a timely manner. There should also be legal ramifications
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levied if the employer does not pay on a timely basis. In the public sector, there may be political
resistance to amend the contribution requirements. However, this may be the right season (post-Covid 19)
for politics to be set aside as many public employers simply do not have enough funds to cover its
liabilities. Another finding shows that, employees contributions added to the total ARC payment made by
the employer, the UL begins to slightly reduce. Public plans may consider a plan design that require an
employee contribution.
The private and public sectors of DB plans are faced with three main risks. The private sector established
rules and regulations (ERISA) to deal with these concerns and help to mitigate these risks. However, the
public sector has not addressed these concerns through a formal mandate such as ERISA. ERISA-like
rules and regulations should be introduced in the public sector to address the issue of compliance. There
are currently no minimum pension plan funding requirements for public plans in the U.S. and therefore
the ARC payment should no longer be an optional payment. Additionally, there is currently no external
insurance or pension guarantee fund for DB public plans. Insurance should be required for public plans
like the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that exists today for private DB
plans which protects plan benefits up to statutory limits. A statutory lien should be enforced if an
employer has not made requirement minimum contributions and unpaid amounts total more than a certain
dollar threshold. Premiums should be financed by tax revenue to provide protection should the
employer become unable to continue the plan. This type of benefit security is necessary as public plans
seek to protect their employees (plan members). Also, there should be minimum reporting requirements
for public pension plans to an entity such as PBGC that can update plan participants about insurance
risks. One suggestion would be that underfunded plans (i.e., below 80% funded ratio) should be closely
monitored and expected to report plan statistics more frequently than those that are adequately funded.
Being transparent is another essential area of improvement in the public sector, oftentimes employees are
not informed of the status (i.e., funding status, investment strategy, etc.) of DB plans. There has been a
shift as noted earlier that DB public plans are no longer solely investing in fixed income investments, but
across multiple asset classes. It is important to provide employees with specifics of the plan and its
inherent risks. One way is to require annual group meetings with employees to review pension plan
status. An annual plan disclosure and or other plan communication materials should be supplied to all DB
participants within the public sector.
Both financial measures and plan design play a critical role in finding ways to reduce the UL. Further
research can be conducted on testing other proxies such as 10-year Treasury notes, 30-year bonds or highgrade municipal bonds to be used as best practice when calculating the assumed investment return.
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Additionally, emphasis was placed on the testing of multiple financial determinants throughout this paper.
Any suggested changes to the annual required contribution (ARC) can be considered a modification to the
plan design. However, research to evaluate and determine the impact of other potential plan design
changes (such as age, years of service, average salary, service credits) would be a beneficial next step for
this study.

Which Financial Measures Can Be Leveraged To Help Close The Unfunded Liability Gap For State Pension Plans? 24

Appendix

Table 1
Please note that Table 3 in listed in the introduction session

Table 2
To compute the approximate annual benefit, multiply the average of the highest 3 years (30 months) of
paid salaries in Connecticut public schools by the appropriate percentage. The percentage shown are
estimated based on full-time credited teaching service. Percentage will be lower for part-time employees.
The minimum qualifications for retirement are: 25 years credited service at any age (20 in CT), or 20
years credited service at age 55 (15 in CT) or 10 years of credited service at age 60 (10 in CT). 21
Retirement Percentage Chart21
(Connecticut public schools)

AGE

20 YRS

21 YRS

22 YRS

23 YRS

24 YRS

25 YRS

55

28.00%

29.40%

30.80%

32.20%

33.60%

56

30.40%

31.92%

33.44%

34.96%

36.48%

35.00%
38.00%

57

32.80%

34.44%

36.08%

37.72%

39.36%

58

35.20%

36.96%

38.72%

40.48%

42.24%

59

37.60%

39.48%

41.36%

43.24%

45.12%

60

40.00%

42.00%

44.00%

46.00%

48.00%

41.00%
44.00%
47.00%
50.00%

Resign at age 60 or Older

10 YRS

15 YRS

20 YRS

Percentage

10.00%

22.50%

40.00%

Table 3
Please note that Table 3 in listed in the Empirical Model session

21

CT official State Website, https://portal.ct.gov/TRB, CT Teacher’s Retirement Board, Benefit Estimator.
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Table 3A: Unfunded Liability as a function of all selected independent variables
Multiple OLS Regression
Panel Data: Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed
Groups: Balanced 1,2,3 and Unbalanced 4 and 5

Sample Years
2003-2018

Group 1
Contribution rate
(Balanced)
Group 2
State Financial
Levers
(Balanced)

Independent
variables

Group 4
Investment Returns
(Unbalanced)

ARCR

-.5500

0.0602

2.0780

0.0000

TAXRPC

1.2200

0.0002

GPERC

-6.7100
1.0904

0.6737

N/A

0.2967

N/A

BUDGDP

DISCR

-1.0400

0.4551

*
****

****

N/A

[-1.8801]

SE

0.2925

F-statistic

R2

[4.7552]

0.4369

44.3990

0.7672

[3.7218]

3.2800

[-0.4211]

1.5900
1.0448
1.3900

34.4427

0.7214

0.7244

T-Stats

[1.0436]
[-0.7470]

-8.2908

0.2050

N/A

[-1.2677]

6.5398

35.6445

PRTRN
EQRTN
FIRTN

-0.3923
-0.0082

0.5579
0.9034

N/A
N/A

[-0.5861]
[-0.1213]

0.6693
0.0682

27.7342

0.3370

0.0561

*

[1.9120]

0.1762

A3YR

0.0008
-0.5791

0.9977
0.0669

N/A
*

[0.2999]
[-1.8336]

0.0029
0.3158

-2.7340

0.0076

***

[-2.6726]

1.0229

-0.3118
0.0266

0.0000
0.8234

****
N/A

[-5.2479]
[-0.2232]

0.0594
0.1191

A5YR
A10YR

Group 5
Investment Allocation
(Unbalanced)

P

ARCR_ER

BUDPC
Group 3
Assumed Discount Rate
(Balanced)

Weighted Stats

EQTALL
FIALL

0.7807

33.3645

0.7230

****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects

Table 3A shows results for all selected independent variables (15-variable linear regression). The independent
variables are shown in five groups – two groups of balanced data and three groups of unbalanced panel data. Results
are shown for beta, probability, T-stats, standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 based on author’s estimation.
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Table 3B: Unfunded Liability as a function of the Optimal Independent Variables (No Lag)
Panel Data: Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed
Groups: Balanced 1 and Unbalanced 2
Sample Years
2003-2018

Weighted Stats

Independent
variables
Balanced
Group 1

Unbalanced
Group 2

P

T-Stats

SE

F-statistic

R2

44.2005

0.7686

30.7049

0.7541

0.2828

ARCR
ARCR_ER
TAXRPC

-0.5171
2.0101
1.1400

0.0670
0.0000
0.0001

*
****
****

[-1.8285]
[4.8434]
[3.8274]

DISCR

-3.737

0.4310

N/A

[-0.7875]

4.7453

FIRTN

0.2797

0.0549

0.1456

-2.6064
-0.1881

0.0007
0.0539

*
****
*

[1.9211]

A10YR
EQTALL

[-3.3823]
[-1.9294]

0.7706
0.0974

0.4150
2.9800

****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects

Table 3B displays panel data that represent independent variables that were statistically significant (7-variables) in
both the balanced and unbalanced group. The discount rate variable, although not significant at this stage is also
shown. The five groups as shown in 3A were condensed two groups displayed in Table 3B. Result shown for beta,
probability, T-stats, standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 are based on author’s estimation.

Table 3C: Unfunded Liability as a function of the Optimal Independent Variables- (No Lag)
Panel Data: Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed
Optimization of Multiple OLS Regressions- Explained Variables
One Group: Combined Balanced and Unbalanced
Sample Years 2003-2018

Weighted Stats

Independent
variables

One Group

P

T-Stats

SE

ARCR
ARCR_ER
TAXRPC

-0.5171
1.9454
2.5800

0.2558
0.0011
0.0004

N/A
****
****

[-1.1367]
[3.2831]
[3.5326]

0.4512

DISCR

-14.8682

0.0044

***

[-2.8526]

5.2120

FIRTN
A10YR
EQTALL

0.2536
-1.7051
-0.0360

0.0328
0.0032
0.6757

**
****
N/A

[2.1371]
[-2.9525]
[-0.4183]

0.1186
0.5775
0.0860

Fstatistic

R2

0.5925
7.2900
42.5630

0.832

****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects

Table 3C combines the balanced and unbalanced variables of panel data from 3B into one group. The discount rate
variable now displays a reduction in the unfunded liability as statistically significant, while ARCR (Employee and
Employer annual required contribution) and EQTALL (equity allocation) are no longer significant. Results shown
for beta, probability, T-stats, standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 are based on author’s estimation.
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Table 4A: Unfunded Liability as a function of the Optimal Independent Variables
(Lagged One-Year and Two -Year Balanced and Unbalanced Groups as shown in Table 3B)
Panel Data: Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed
Groups: Balanced 1 and Unbalanced 2
Sample Years 2003-2018

Weighted Stats

Independent
variables
Balanced
Group 1

Unbalanced
Group 2

P

T-Stats

SE

ARCR(-1)
ARCR(-2)

-0.6638
-0.7780

0.0132
0.0015

**
***

[-2.4791]
[-3.1745]

0.2677
0.2450

ARCR_ER(-1)
ARCR_ER(-2)

1.9974
1.7964

0.0000
0.0000

****
****

[5.2974]
[5.3563]

0.3770
0.3353

TAXRPC(-1)
TAXRPC(-2)

1.0100
7.0900

0.0245
0.0964

**
*

[2.2505]
[1.6634]

4.5000
4.2600

DISCR(-1)
DISCR(-2)

-4.3797
-3.6850

0.2550
0.0105

N/A
***

[-1.1386]
[-2.5604]

3.8465
1.4392

FIRTN(-1)
FIRTN(-2)

0.3473
0.2749

0.0127
0.0193

**
**

[2.4944]
[2.3427]

0.1392
0.1173

A10YR(-1)
A10YR(-2)

-3.0366
-2.2296

0.0000
0.0325

****
**

[-4.9121]
[-2.1400]

0.6181
1.0418

EQTALL(-1)
EQTALL(-2)

-0.1767
-0.2808

0.0570
0.0038

*
***

[-1.9050]
[-2.8985]

0.0928
0.0968

****p<0.001 ;***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects

F-statistic

R2

Lag
Year

40.9220
37.2817

0.7562
0.7410

1
2

32.0292
31.9573

0.7960
0.86063

1
2

Using data as shown in Table 3B, this table displays the variable results with a one- and two-year lag. Two groups
are shown in Table 4. The results show that the Employer annual contribution rate (ARCR_ER) is highly
statistically significant, two-year lag on discount rate (DISCR) shows statically significant and the one- year lag on
the 10 year (A10YR) is even more robust when results are lagged. Results shown for beta, probability, T-stats,
standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 are based on author’s estimation.
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Table 4B: Walt Test [Joint Significance Test]- No Lag
Panel Data: Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed
One Group: Combined Balanced and Unbalanced
Dependent Variable: Unfunded Liability as a % to Assets (RUFL)
Independent
Variables

Standard
Error (SE)

ARCR

-0.5236

ARCR_ER

1.9379

0.5925

TAXRPC
DISCR
FIRTN
A10YR
EQTALL

2.540
-14.3630
0.2536
-1.7051
-0.0361

7.2900
5.2120
0.1186
0.5775
0.0860

F-statistics

0.4512

Probability
0.0000
****
****

14.282

****
****
****
****
****

****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects
The model was evaluated to see whether all coefficients were equal to zero. Results were highly significant, and we conclude that
the model has predictive power where at least one of the independent variables (X) help to predict our dependent variable (Y).

Results shown for beta, probability, standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 are based on author’s estimation.
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Fig. 1
Unfunded Liability (In Total $'s)
vs Unfunded Liability (as % of assets)
2003-2018
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Fig. 1 displays the total aggregated unfunded liability which is the dependent variable. The total value vs. the
unfunded liability as a percentage of assets from 2003-2018 is shown. The panel model was adjusted to reflect those
plans that reported PPD data during 2003-2018.

Fig. 2
Average 10-yr Return
2003-2018
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Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of the average 10-year return of all aggregated plans used in the dataset from 2003-2018.
Note that 2004 shows the highest average 10-year return of 9.7% vs. lower returns 3.1% and 3.5% in 2009 and 2010.
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Fig. 3
Discount Rate vs. Average 10-Year Return
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Fig. 3 shows the assumed investment return known as the discount rate vs. the actual average 10- year return. This
discount rate is used to value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by estimating expected
rates of return on all aggregated plans in dataset from 2003-2018. The average 10-year return is the return of all
aggregated plans used in the dataset from 2003-2018. The discount rate shows a consistent average of 7.8% vs. the
average10-year return of 6.8%.

Fig. 4
Annual Required Contributions (ARC)
(as a % of payroll)
2003-2008
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Fig. 4 shows the Annual Required Contribution by the employer [ARCR_ER] and the Annual Required
Contribution by both the employee and the employer [ARCR] from 2003-2018. Note that 2003 shows the lowest
total contributions of 26% of payroll and 2017 shows the highest at 50% of payroll. These numbers are shown as a
percentage of payroll of all aggregated plans used in the PPD dataset from 2003-2018.

2018
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Fig. 5
Equity vs. Fixed Allocation
2003-2018
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Fig. 5 shows the equity, fixed and other allocations (real estate, alternatives, private equities, commodities, cash, and
other asset classes) aggregated by all plans used in dataset over the 16-year period. Note that there is higher
percentage of equity allocation to fixed income allocation over each of the 16 years. Excluding 2008, assets were
also allocated to real estate, alternatives, private equities, commodities, and cash. The 2008 allocation shows that the
financial crisis has impacted the allocation choices of many of the public pension plans across the U.S. Overall, the
chart shows that there has been a shift from fixed income to equities within public pension plans.
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Fig. 6
Equity Returns vs. Fixed Returns
2003-2018
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Fig. 6 shows both equity and fixed returns aggregated by all plans used in PPD dataset from 2003-2018. Note that
the 2008 allocation to equities and fixed income as shown on Fig. 5 is 60.8% and 39.3% respectively and generated
a negative return of 17.0% as shown in Fig 6. Additionally, the 2009 allocation to equities and fixed income as
shown on Fig. 5 is 51.5% and 28.5% respectively and generated a negative return of 15.1% as shown in Fig 6.
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1
State
ABBR

Plan Name

Plan Full Name

1

AL

Alabama ERS

Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama

2

AL

Alabama Teachers

Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama

3

AK

Alaska PERS

State of Alaska Public Employees’ Retirement System

4

AK

Alaska Teachers

State of Alaska Teachers’ Retirement System

5

AZ

Arizona Public Safety

Arizona Public Safety Personnel Retirement System

6

AZ

Arizona SRS

Arizona State Retirement System

94

AZ

Phoenix ERS

Phoenix Employees' Retirement System

127

AZ

Arizona State Corrections Officers

Arizona State Corrections Officers Retirement Plan

176

AZ

Tucson Supplemental RS

Tucson Supplemental Retirement System

7

AR

Arkansas PERS

Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System

8

AR

Arkansas Teachers

Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Plan ID

9

CA

California PERF

California Public Employees Retirement Fund

10

CA

California Teachers

California State Teachers’ Retirement System

18

CA

Contra Costa County

Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association

43

CA

LA County ERS

Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association

97

CA

San Diego County

San Diego County Employees Retirement Association

98

CA

San Francisco City & County

San Francisco City & County Employees' Retirement System

111

CA

University of California

University of California Retirement Plan

137

CA

Alameda County ERS

Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association

138

CA

Kern County ERS

Kern County Employees' Retirement Association

139

CA

Los Angeles ERS

Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System

140

CA

Los Angeles Fire and Police

Los Angeles City Fire and Police Pension System

141

CA

Los Angeles Water and Power

Los Angeles Water and Power Employees' Retirement Plan

142

CA

Orange County ERS

Orange County Employees Retirement System

143

CA

Sacramento County ERS

Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System

144

CA

San Diego City ERS

San Diego City Employees' Retirement System

13

CO

Colorado Municipal

Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-Local Division

14

CO

Colorado School

Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-School Division

15

CO

Colorado State

Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-State Division

22

CO

Denver Employees

Denver Employees Retirement Plan

23

CO

Denver Schools

Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-Denver Public Schools Division

16

CT

Connecticut SERS

Connecticut State Employees Retirement System

17

CT

Connecticut Teachers

Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System

128

CT

Connecticut Municipal

Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System

21

DE

Delaware State Employees' Pension Plan

195

DE

Delaware State Employees
Delaware County and Municipal
Employees

Delaware County and Municipal Other Employees
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis (ctd)1
State
ABBR

Plan Name

Plan Full Name

FL

Florida RS

Florida Retirement System

27

GA

Georgia ERS

Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia

28

GA

Georgia Teachers

Teachers Retirement System of Georgia

161

GA

Atlanta ERS

Atlanta General Employees' Pension Fund

29

HI

Hawaii ERS

Employees’ Retirement System of the State of Hawaii

31

ID

Idaho PERS

Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho

11

IL

Chicago Teachers

Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago

32

IL

Illinois Municipal

Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund

33

IL

Illinois SERS

State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois

34

IL

Illinois Teachers

Teachers' Retirement System of The State of Illinois

Plan ID

35

IL

Illinois Universities

State Universities Retirement System of Illinois

145

IL

Chicago Municipal

Chicago Municipal Employees' Annuity Benefit Fund

36

IN

Indiana PERF

State of Indiana Public Employees' Retirement Fund

37

IN

Indiana Teachers

Indiana State Teachers’ Retirement Fund

38

IA

Iowa PERS

Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System

129

IA

Iowa Municipal Fire and Police

Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa

39

KS

Kansas PERS

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System

179

KS

Wichita ERS

Wichita Employees' Retirement System

40

KY

Kentucky County

County Employees Retirement System of Kentucky

41

KY

Kentucky ERS

Kentucky Employees Retirement System

42

KY

Kentucky Teachers

Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Kentucky

44

LA

Louisiana SERS

Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System

45

LA

Louisiana Teachers

Louisiana State Teachers Retirement System

163

LA

Baton Rouge City Parish RS

Baton Rouge City Parish Employees' Retirement System

197

LA

Louisiana Municipal Employees

Louisiana Municipal Employees

46

ME

Maine Local

Maine Public Employees Retirement System - Participating Local Districts

47

ME

Maine State and Teacher

Maine Public Employees Retirement System - State and Teacher Retirement Program

48

MD

Maryland PERS

Maryland State Retirement and Pension System - Employees Combined System

49

MD

Maryland Teachers

Maryland State Retirement and Pension System - Teachers Combined System

155

MD

Baltimore Fire and Police

Baltimore Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System

50

MA

Massachusetts SRS

Massachusetts State Retirement System

51

MA

Massachusetts Teachers

Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System

52

MI

Michigan Municipal

Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Michigan

53

MI

Michigan Public Schools

Michigan Public School Employees’ Retirement System

54

MI

Michigan SERS

Michigan State Employees’ Retirement System

57

MN

Minnesota State Employees

Minnesota State Employees Retirement Fund

58

MN

Minnesota Teachers

Teachers Retirement Association of Minnesota
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1
State
ABBR

Plan Name

Plan Full Name

103

MN

St. Paul Teachers

St. Paul Teachers Retirement Fund

133

MN

Minnesota Police and Fire

Minnesota Public Employees Police & Fire Plan

59

MS

Mississippi PERS

Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi

60

MO

Missouri DOT and Highway

Missouri Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol Employees' Retirement Syst

61

MO

Missouri Local

Missouri Local Government Employees Retirement System

62

MO

Missouri PEERS

Public Education Employee Retirement System of Missouri

63

MO

Missouri State Employees

Missouri State Employees’ Retirement System

64

MO

Missouri Teachers

Public School Retirement System of Missouri

102

MO

St. Louis School Employees

Public School Retirement System of the City of St. Louis

65

MT

Montana PERS

Montana Public Employees' Retirement System

Plan ID

66

MT

Montana Teachers

Teachers' Retirement System of Montana

162

NE

Omaha School

Omaha School Employees' Retirement System

203

NE

Omaha City Employees Retirement System

68

NV

Omaha ERS
Nevada Police Officer and
Firefighter

69

NV

Nevada Regular Employees

Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada - Regular Employees Plan

70

NH

New Hampshire RS

New Hampshire Retirement System

190

NH

Manchester Employees'
Contributory Retirement System

Manchester Employees' Contributory Retirement System

71

NJ

New Jersey PERS

Public Employees’ Retirement System of New Jersey

72

NJ

New Jersey Police & Fire

The Police and Firemen’s Retirement System of New Jersey

73

NJ

New Jersey Teachers

Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund of New Jersey

202

NJ

Jersey City Municipal Employees
Pension Fund

Jersey City Municipal Employees Pension Fund

74

NM

New Mexico PERA

Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico

75

NM

New Mexico Educational

Educational Retirement Board of New Mexico

76

NY

New York City ERS

New York City Employees' Retirement System

77

NY

New York City Teachers

Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York

78

NY

New York State Teachers

New York State Teachers’ Retirement System

83

NY

NY State & Local ERS

New York State and Local Retirement System - Employees’ Retirement System

84

NY

NY State & Local Police & Fire

New York State and Local Retirement System - Police and Fire Retirement System

79

NC

North Carolina Local Governmental Employees’ Retirement System

80

NC

North Carolina Local Government
North Carolina Teachers and State
Employees

182

NC

Charlotte Firefighters' RS

Charlotte Firefighters' Retirement System

81

ND

North Dakota PERS

North Dakota Public Employees Retirement System

82

ND

North Dakota Teachers

North Dakota Teachers' Fund for Retirement

Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada - Police and Firefighters Plan

Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System of North Carolina
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1
Plan ID

State
ABBR

Plan Name

Plan Full Name

85

OH

Ohio PERS

Ohio Public Employees Retirement System

86

OH

Ohio Police & Fire

Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund

87

OH

Ohio School Employees

School Employees’ Retirement System of Ohio

88

OH

Ohio Teachers

School Employees’ Retirement System of Ohio

160

OH

Cincinnati ERS

Cincinnati Employees' Retirement System

89

OK

Oklahoma PERS

Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System

90

OK

Oklahoma Teachers

Teachers' Retirement System of Oklahoma

134

OK

Oklahoma Police

Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System

91

OR

Oregon PERS

Oregon Public Employees Retirement System

92

PA

Pennsylvania School Employees

Public School Employees’ Retirement System of Pennsylvania

93

PA

Pennsylvania State ERS

Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System

136

PA

Pennsylvania Municipal

Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System

152

PA

Philadelphia Municipal

Philadelphia Municipal Retirement System

95

RI

Rhode Island ERS

Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island

96

RI

Rhode Island Municipal

Rhode Island Municipal Employees’ Retirement System

99

SC

South Carolina Police

South Carolina Police Officers Retirement System

100

SC

South Carolina RS

South Carolina Retirement System

101

SD

South Dakota RS

South Dakota Retirement System

109

TN

TN Political Subdivisions

Tennessee Political Subdivisions Retirement Plan

110

TN

TN State and Teachers

Tennessee State and Teachers' Retirement Plan

158

TN

Nashville-Davidson ERS

Nashville Davidson Metropolitan Employee Benefit System

12

TX

Austin ERS

City of Austin Employees' Retirement System

104

TX

Texas County & District

Texas County & District Retirement System

105

TX

Texas ERS

Employees Retirement System of Texas

106

TX

Texas LECOS

Texas Law Enforcement and Custodial Officer Supplemental Retirement Fund

107

TX

Texas Municipal

Texas Municipal Retirement System

108

TX

Texas Teachers

Teacher Retirement System of Texas

201

TX

Dallas ERS

Dallas Employees Retirement System

204

TX

Houston Municipal

Houston Municipal Employees Retirement Fund

112

UT

Utah Noncontributory

Utah Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System

135

UT

Utah Public Safety

Utah Public Safety and Firefighter Retirement Plan

113

VT

Vermont State Employees

Vermont State Employees' Retirement System

114

VT

Vermont Teachers

State Teachers' Retirement System of Vermont

199

VT

Vermont Municipal Employees

Vermont Municipal Employees

25

VA

Fairfax County Schools

Educational Employees’ Supplementary Retirement System of Fairfax County

115

VA

Virginia RS

Virginia Retirement System

117

WA

Washington LEOFF Plan 2

Washington Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters Plan 2

119
120

WA

Washington PERS 2/3

Washington Public Employees’ Retirement System

WA

Washington School Employees
Pl 2/3

Washington School Employees Plan 2
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1
Plan ID

State
ABBR

Plan Name

Plan Full Name

122

WA

Washington Teachers Plan 2/3

Washington Teachers Plan 2/3

123

WV

West Virginia PERS

West Virginia Public Employees’ Retirement System

124

WV

West Virginia Teachers

West Virginia Teachers’ Retirement System

125

WI

Wisconsin RS

Wisconsin Retirement System

151

WI

Milwaukee City ERS

Milwaukee City Employees' Retirement System

126

WY

Wyoming Public Employees

State of Wyoming Retirement System

Public Plan Database (PPD) (2019) Public plans data. Available at https://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database, Google
Scholar.
1
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